ABSTRACT

Victimology was first proposed as a social science in the 1940s during a shift in interest in victims to gain a better understanding of crime. The early victimologists focused on the role that victims played in crime, which resulted in the concept that some victims contribute to, or precipitate, their victimisation. Later victimologists focused on the process of victimisation, including the treatment of victims in the criminal justice system. These and other theoretical perspectives have evolved from data obtained from various investigational techniques, such as victim surveys. As an empirical knowledge has evolved so too has the push for victimology to be considered a social science. This paper canvases the debate on whether victimology is a social science. It proposes that victimology cannot be a social science unless victimologists apply a scientific method. This paper also argues that victimology, like other social sciences, cannot employ the pure scientific method associated with the natural sciences but victimologists should be empirical, theoretical and cumulative. As well, it gives an overview of several steps taken by victimologists to raise the status of their fledgling science, including establishing institutes and even proposing a single victim-centred theory. It concludes that victimology has not yet attained the status of a social science but also it is no longer just a sub-discipline of criminology, as it once stood accused.

The study of victimisation is not unique to modern times; it also concerned ancient societies. The systematic study of this phenomenon, however, only arose recently when victimology was proposed as an alternative to criminology in the 1940s. Since then, the 'inelegant term' (Sparkes, 1982: p. 22) [that 'is easy to say' (Cressey, 1988: p. 43)] has been used in a number of somewhat distinct, though overlapping, ways. The World Society of Victimology and Karmen (1996: p. 2) define victimology as the scientific study of victims of crime; the extent, nature and causes of criminal victimisation and its consequences for the persons involved as well as the study of the reactions to and treatment of victims of crime. Consistent with this comparatively narrow definition, Fattah (1991) identifies natural and human sources of victimisation but then concludes that victimology as a science should be confined to the study of victims of crime. Conversely, others such as Schneider (1982) and Kirchhoff (2003) do not limit victimology to the scientific study of victims of crime and their plight. For example, Elias (1986) argues for a global victimology that would cover victims
of human rights violations, including victims of conventional crimes. Knudten (1992) differentiates the parameters in terms of the three elements of crimes, accident-disasters and abuse of power. These classes could overlap — some abuses of power are also criminal offences; some accidents might result from, for example, breaches of environmental or work-safety laws. According to Friday (1992: p. 11), Knudten 'incorporates nearly every contingency' of victimisation but his proposal also 'explains all and it explains nothing'. In a paper published in an earlier issue of this journal, Garkawe (2004) summarised the debate on the scope of victimology. He distinguished the study of victims of crime, victims of human rights violations and victims of everything. He showed that these categories are not necessarily exclusive. Conceivably, victimology spans the plight of individuals and collectives of people who suffer deprivation, disadvantage, loss or injury due to any cause. It is evident, however, that victims of crime are widely accepted as within the scope of victimology and that victimologists have put more effort into studying victims of crime.

Despite the unresolved debate on the scope of victimology, there is no doubt that victimology has been, and continues to be, noticeably influenced by its origin, by academic interests in crime, and by 'law and order' politics as well as by changeable currents of social opinion, with the result that concern for victims of crime has dominated victimological discourse. Many of the theoretical concepts, for example, are drawn from criminology and then adapted to place the victim at the centre rather than the criminal.

It is not the purpose of this paper to untangle the ambiguities and complexities that plague the debate on the scope of victimology. It is sufficient to acknowledge that the subject matter of victimology is blurred. It is not the certainty of its scope that determines whether victimology is a science. What does determine whether victimology has attained the status of a science? Answering this question is the aim of the current paper.

THE ORIGIN OF VICTIMOLOGY AS A SCIENCE

Victimology's roots are often attributed to Mendelsohn (1940, 1956; see Walklate, 1989) and von Hentig (1940, 1948; see Elias, 1986), whom Walklate (2007: p. 3) calls 'émigré lawyers'; the crimonologists Wolfgang (1957) and Nagel (1963; see van Dijk, 1999); and the psychiatrist Werham (1949; see Fattah, 1991 and Zedner, 1997). Kirchhoff (2003, 2007) asserts that this conventional view on the origin of victimology neglects the much earlier essays of Beccaria that became the foundation of classical criminology. Beccaria highlighted the plight of victims of abuse of power, such as victims of corrupt public officials. He protested against arbitrary judicial decisions and cruel and inhumane punishment. However, Kirchhoff does not delve further into the history of criminology, for if he did, he would discover occasional references to the victim, among them Garofalo (1914) who, three decades before Mendelsohn
and von Hentig promulgated their ideas, observed that the victim sometimes provoked another person to attack, which could result in the victim's death.

Overall, however, a review of the history of criminology confirms that there was 'no place for the pathos and pains of individual victims' (Rock, 2007) in positivist criminology and that social interactionists more often than not neglected the victim. In the 1970s, for instance, Rock points out that Cohen and Taylor (1976) conceded that they had 'no notion of rule-breaking as harmful' (Rock, 2007: p. 39). He also highlights the confusion as the hunted fugitive (Sagarin, 1975) and the mismanaged deviant (Cohen, 1979) are portrayed as the victim in radical criminological inquiry. As Dignan (2005: p. 33) says, these criminologists 'tend to see offenders as the principal victims of state oppression and to downplay or ignore altogether those who were in turn victimised by them'.

Hence, there was and remains fertile ground for Mendelsohn's (1940, 1963) proposal for a new science that would be the 'reverse' of criminology. Instead of studying the criminal, he advocated a focus on the 'victimual'. He initially turned his attention to the culpability of the victim of crime. At about the same time that Mendelsohn first promulgated his thesis, von Hentig (1940) argued the importance of understanding the victim's role in the causation of crime. Mendelsohn referred to the 'penal couple' (1963) and von Hentig the 'duet' (1948). Both put forward their own 'typology of victims', both suggested a need to investigate the part victims play in their victimisation. Despite these commonalities, Sparkes (1982: p. 22) states that it is likely that von Hentig would have 'vigorously rejected Mendelsohn's proposal that "there is a point in the scientific study of victims"'. Whatever his actual view might have been, von Hentig and Mendelsohn raised good reasons to challenge the virtually exclusive focus in criminology on the criminal and the causes of his or her offending.

Like Mendelsohn, Werthem (1949) recognised the need for a crime victim-centred science, which he named victimology. He argued that this new science should concentrate on murderers' victims. Wolfgang's (1957) study on homicide victims, followed by the writings of Nagel (1963) and Schafer (1968), both criminologists, added substance to the ideas of the first victimologists. Wolfgang, for instance, showed that victims and killers are sometimes 'mutual participants in homicide'; in other words, some victims precipitate their murder. Nagel reported on the victim in the criminal justice system, and Schafer argued that victims often contribute to crime by their negligence, precipitation, or provocation. Whatever one's views on this approach, there can be no doubt that any of their gains were set back by Amir's (1967; 1975) study of rapes. Amir dared to assert that there was some reciprocal action between the rape victim and the rapist, which (as explained later) became the object of hostile rebuke.

Rock (2002) accuses these 'proto-victimologists' of being 'not much more than abstracted empiricists searching for a theory, a language and academic legitimacy' (Rock, 2002: p. 3). Scientific realists will agree; scientific anti-realists will disagree. Mendelsohn's notion of culpability reflects his legal
background, while von Hentig's observations about women and children are mostly indicative of a male gender bias. Both were influenced by the cultural norms of the time and neither of them complied with the rigid laws of the scientific method associated with the natural sciences. Their reasoning (especially von Hentig's work) provided Wolfgang (1957) and then Amir (1967, 1975), with useful theoretical bases to study victims' involvement in murder and rape. These studies, in spite of their flaws, showed that Mendelsohn's and von Hentig's assertions were not completely irrelevant and misplaced. Rather, they were instrumentally useful to our understanding the causes of criminal victimisation. These 'proto-victimologists' fuelled new perspectives leading to new insights about victims and crime. Criminology, which had been offender oriented, gained from the evolving knowledge but, by the 1970s, victimology still was not the 'scientific endeavour' that Mendelsohn and Werthem had advocated.

Even the most ardent critics cannot deny though that the principal idea of victimology as a social science survived, although it had not prevailed. Rather it was being weighed down by criminological roots. For example, victim-precipitation, which was a central and constant concept of the early victimologists' work, has 'inhibited [its] development' (Meier and Miethe, 1993: p. 463). In the 1970s, the concept was portrayed as victim-blaming (Clark and Lewis, 1977). It was severely criticised and, in the eyes of some critics, discredited (Goodey, 2005). Yet, in careful commentary Fattah (1991) points out that precipitation is not provocation; the former is a clinical concept, the latter a legal concept. It is meaningful to explore the victim's participation to better understand the causes of crime. The resultant knowledge should be used to prevent criminal victimisation, not to blame victims. Life-style theory (Hindelang et al., 1978; Gottfredson and Hindelang, 1981) and routine activity theory (Cohen and Felson, 1979) are prime illustrations of how acknowledging that some people are prone to victimisation can shape efforts to prevent victimisation. Provocation, on the other hand, is associated with blameworthiness. It presumes that the victim contributed to his or her demise and is about shifting blame from the victimiser to mitigate his or her criminal responsibility. Provocation, like precipitation, has been attacked by feminist commentators. In the eyes of some victimologists (Fattah, 1991) precipitation remains an important concept in understanding crime. Certainly, it features in discourse on the prevention of property crime and continues to influence some victim programmes, such as state-funded victim compensation schemes. Even public opinion is often swayed against the victim because of value judgments about deservedness and contribution.

Although debate in the 1970s and 1980s on early victimological concepts was frequently bad-tempered, it nurtured refreshed theoretical perspectives on criminal victimology. These perspectives emerged in the main from a realisation that victimological research is important for the acquisition of a better understanding of crime and its effects and for improved approaches to
criminal justice (see for example Fattah, 1999). The evolving interest in criminal victimology is illustrated in several ways. International symposia were held in Israel (1973), United States (1976), Germany (1979), Japan (1982), Zagreb (1985) and Israel again (1988). These symposia stimulated the publication of about one dozen books and numerous journal articles. Papers on victimology also featured at international criminological conferences in Europe (Schneider, 2001).

By the 1990s several theoretical streams had evolved. Karmen (1996) outlines the tenets of conservative, liberal, and radical-critical victimology. Mawby and Walklate (1994) discuss positivist victimology, radical victimology (see also Friedrichs, 1983), and critical victimology (see also Walklate, 1989). Schneider (2001) identifies several victimological theories: sociol-structural, cultural and institutional victimisation, and situation-oriented theories. Rock (2007) associates modern victimology with feminist criminology, routine activities theory and a composite of other theories, such as republican theory (Braithwaite, 1989), that serves as the basis for reintegrative shaming approaches to restorative justice.

Contrary to the array of theoretical perspectives that have emerged since the 1940s, O'Connor (2005) accuses victimology as having 'few theories and little or no schools of thought'. Likewise, Goodey (2005: p. 11) says victimology lacks 'the academic weight of theory and critique that is the domain of criminology' (Goodey, 2005: p. 11). If this criticism is true then it is particularly damning in light of Rock's (2007: p. 38) opinion that criminology is a 'minor discipline with few practitioners and many gaps'. Victimology's status as a science appears even worse when one takes into account Cressey's astonishing statement that, after years considering the possibility of a science of criminology (Sutherland et al., 1992), sociology is the only true social science.

Cressey was committed to the ideals and goals of science. In the 1980s he asserted that victimology will never be a science of its own (1982, see also 1988). Instead, he assessed it to be a non-academic collection of ideas, interests, ideologies and research methods. He was not alone in his rebuke. Fattah (1986), for instance, called for scientific victimology to be separated from humanist victimology. Friday (1988; see also 1992) criticised victimology for being less than scientific. He also bemoaned that treatment had become part of victimology and queried the relevance of this clinical orientation if victimology were to continue to develop as a scientific endeavour. The discourse on the shortcomings of victimology as a science continued in a similar vein through the 1990s. Morosowa (1999: p. 293), for example, observed that victimology has been overly reliant on subjective descriptive anecdotes. He, too, advocated a scientific victimology grounded in empiricism. Likewise, Groenhuijsen at the XIth International Symposium on Victimology pleaded for a greater rigour in victimology to ensure a credible body of victimological knowledge (see also Groenhuijsen, 1999).
VICTIMOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHOD

Despite the apparent pessimism, Friday (1988), Morosowa (1999) and later O'Connor (2004) expressed the view that if victimology could distinguish scientifically accurate and verifiable knowledge from non-scientific then it would attain the status of a social science. If they are correct then victimology cannot be considered a social science unless victimologists use a scientific method, which is no mystery**. Indeed Hoyst (1982) pointed this out at an international symposium on victimology when he outlined the tasks of a scientific victimology as to diagnose the situation, to interpret the situation, to prevent undesired situations and to suggest ways of creating desired situations.

This is not an argument for scientific victimology that mimics, without compromise, a prescriptive method associated with pure science as this would stifle the development of knowledge. On the other hand, it is contrary to 'an anything goes' approach. Crime, for example, is not a stable concept, rather it varies from time to time and place to place hence universal propositions cannot be made, which in the context of pure science would render the study of criminal victimisation impossible. Victimology can only apply scientific method in a limited way: for example, it would be unethical to take a sample of people, subject half of them to a crime and observe the relative outcomes. Hence, victimologists can only study those people who happen already to be victims. This means they cannot do truly allocated experiments, where a random, representative sample is used, but only ex post-facto research. Scientific victimology is also fraught with conceptual problems. Every crime is embedded within a complex social web, although the crime itself usually happens at a specific time and place. Becoming a victim is integrated, even interwoven, in the victim's everyday life. Consequently, the totality of the experience — pre-victimised, victimised and post-victimised — cannot be objectively observed in ways to discover true causal attributions. Victimological research is predominantly retrospective and the resultant data are in the pure scientific sense imperfect. Victimologists frequently work under real life conditions, beyond the laboratory experience. This is not unique to victimology; rather it is inherent in all social sciences.

Victimological knowledge, therefore, is largely the product of inferences derived from a variety of approaches, including victimisation surveys and

** According to Weir (1991: p. 8), victimology achieves the status of a social science by:
- being empirically based on observation and logical analysis;
- being theoretical — for example, summarising complex observations;
- devising abstract propositions that explain relationships;
- being accumulative — that is, developing theories that build upon one another; and
- publishing research findings for checking by other scholars.
victimisation studies. Fattah (1991: p. 30) says victimisation surveys are among the 'most exciting developments in criminology', not victimology. Kaiser (1993, in Schneider, 2001: p. 451) states that these surveys are the 'most substantive empirical research concepts' in recent decades. Hope (2007), however, points out that much of the empirical data from cross-sectional sample surveys is vulnerable to selection bias and artificiality. He concludes though that 'unreflective "realism" based on direct observation' is similarly problematic (p. 86).

It is, however, generally accepted that it is vitally important for victimological knowledge to be accurate and as reliable as possible. Victimologists must strive to minimise the impact of the social complexities on their research. In their analysis, they should isolate the necessary from the unnecessary (Kirchhoff, 2007). If they do not employ the scientific method then victimology cannot be considered a social science. Furthermore, the ramifications have implications for victims. Fattah (1999), for example, warned that unproven treatments can be the cause of unnecessary victimisation. As well, Davis and others (1999) suggested that the emphasis of welfare-based victim services programmes might be misplaced, while a later study by Sims et al. (2006) showed that there is no significant difference between victims who use these services and those who do not when it comes to improvement in their psychological functioning. An earlier study (Skogan et al., 1990) revealed a significant mismatch between victims' stated needs and the services provided by mainstream victim assistance programmes. Although their knowledge on the extent and consequences of victimisation has grown, very little is known about the efficacy of programmes intended to alleviate those consequences. Understandably, social scientists have warned that unless research continues to be done on victims' needs and so on, there will be a persistent danger that victim service programmes will not serve victims (Maguire and Shapland, 1990). Groenhuijsen (1999) warned that without a better understanding of causal relationships to guide policies and practices to address crime victims' needs, we run the risk of inflicting injustice.

Having said these things, if victims are to benefit from the acquired knowledge then it is not always appropriate to wait until theoretical knowledge is complete. Victims could suffer in anticipation of one day receiving the help they needed yesterday. The natural sciences did not develop because researchers accumulated a mass of facts about an observed phenomenon. Rather, they evolved as researchers intentionally experimented with phenomena, on the basis of ideas and hypotheses, and disclosed new observations. The evolving victimological knowledge should be subjected to excavation and critique. Thus, the scientific method is both developing and corrective. Hence, victimology ought to be the label attached to the body of knowledge acquired through a scientific method regarding victimisation as a social phenomenon. This phenomenon is very broad and, according to victimologists like Fattah (1991), too difficult to tackle as a whole.
A cursory glance at several authoritative victimology texts highlights the theories that constitute victimology, in particular, criminal victimology. It also shows the many discernible and complex influences in the field of victimology. Furthermore, sociologists, criminologists, psychiatrists, psychologists, anthropologists, political scientists, lawyers and others share this field as they probe the depths and breadth of all aspects of victimisation. Victimology has also been associated with the emerging discipline of traumatology. Notably most academics who claim to be victimologists, or who have at least shown an interest in victimology as a science, have been influenced by more than one 'school' and more than one discipline. This presents as one of the challenges for victimology if it is to become a social science in its own right.

In a young and evolving science disputes are to be expected; indeed, they often happen in all the sciences. Victimology is no exception. Victimologists differ about what victimology should or should not include, about what should be the focus and about what research methods are best. Thus, the domain of victimology is not sharply defined, which is not problematic. Few sciences have exact boundaries. Even the natural sciences are not wholly distinct from each other. Victimologists have not, however, agreed on how best to synthesise the ideas, concepts and diversity in thinking into a coherent body of knowledge. Instead, serious differences are apparent, some of which are attributable to the different academic disciplines; each with its sensitivities and discourse. This is not to deny that there are elements of mutuality of understanding. Victimologists have adapted the empirical methods of other social sciences (for instance, psychological research has informed treatment of victims). Is it possible, even desirable, for victimologists who draw from such a wide range to find a distinctiveness that sets victimology apart from other social sciences? Is it possible, even desirable, to devise a unified conceptual scheme for theory and research in victimology?

The basis of a coherent body of knowledge actually rests on the preparedness of victimologists to distinguish themselves by placing the victim at the centre of their research and academic endeavours. Doing so brings out a vividness that shows clearly that the different strands of thought or theoretical perspectives flow together to produce some coherence and the grounding for an even greater knowledge. A general victimological theory that places the victim at the centre should have three core functions: it should help in the codification of the existing concrete knowledge; it should be a guide to research; and it should facilitate the control of biases of observation and interpretation that are presently evident in the research and the resultant knowledge. If this is to be the aim then the first steps must be to find facts, devise principles and develop theories that will account for as many observations as possible within a sound framework. This could help victimology attain a sharpness that it currently lacks. Furthermore, rather than be overshadowed by other social sciences, such as criminology, it would contribute to the development of those sciences.
Mendelsohn, one of the fathers of victimology as already outlined, explained, some twenty years after his initial essay on victimology, that he intended that victims in general should be studied from a 'bio-psycho-social point of view' (1963: p. 239; see also Mendelsohn, 1976). In recent years, Dussich (2007) has advanced this view in his psycho-social coping theoretical model for understanding general victimisation and facilitating recovery. His model is not restricted to victims of crime, so it could be applied to other victims; thus, it pulls together the different strands of the debate on the scope of victimology. He is able to do so because the victim is the focal point of his analysis. Furthermore, he uses behavioural and social, rather than legal concepts; and states that his primary goals are to be explanatory, utilitarian and dynamic. He grounds it in social psychology, social control theory, stress theory, symbolic interactionism and behaviourism. Dussich's model sits well with the scientific approach advocated above. The model is the outcome of studies that deal with the relationship between victimisation as a phenomenon and certain aspects of the situation in which this takes place.

VICTIMOLOGY AND VICTIM ASSISTANCE

Victimology has (correctly) been criticised as being less than scientific. Its association with the victim movement especially has threatened to compromise its academic credibility. Victimology has been ill-defined to include theoretical and applied victimology, as well as humanist and activist victimology. On occasions, the connection between scientific and humanist victimology has resulted in empirical confirmation being subservient to popularly acceptable rhetoric. Some of the impressive articles and texts are not generally thought of as being scientific, yet they graphically illustrate, for example, the effects of crime and the ways the criminal justice system alienates victims.

Some in the victim movement accuse the academics of being obsessively preoccupied with their methods. In their eyes, attempts to quantify victims' trauma and to demand only evidence-based treatments be employed, for instance, have become ends in themselves. Some academic victimologists stand accused of overly scientifising victimology. For victim assistance, however, to be able to provide the most effective and appropriate support to victims, it is essential, for instance, that up-to-date information on victims' needs (obtained through scientifically valid approaches) be available.

The more critical scientists are disturbed by the influence of 'victim-gurus' whose rhetoric not only blinds their believers but also risks re-victimising the very people they claim to be helping. To bolster their fledgling science, many academic victimologists across the globe have sought to separate victimology as science from victim assistance. They have established institutes of victimology in Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Peru and Spain. The purposes and placement of these institutes adds thought to the controversy on whether victimology is a science or a sub-discipline, or one of the humanities (perhaps even an art). The
Centro interdipartimentale di ricerca sulla vittimologia e sulla sicurezza (C.I.R.Vi.S.) at the University of Bologna promotes an interdisciplinary approach on issues relating to victimisation and assistance to victims. The Tokiwa International Victimology Institute is run out of the College for Human Science, Tokiwa University. The Institute is a resource for all victimological academic, research, training and service activities. It is primarily aimed at providing information for universities, government agencies, and non-government organizations in Japan and other countries. The International Victimology Institute Tilburg is supported by the Faculty of Law and the Faculty of Social and Behavioural Sciences of Tilburg University, Netherlands. Law is not usually regarded as a social science, rather it is one of the humanities; and the social and behavioural sciences are very broad with some encompassing a scientific application and others having little scientific concentration. The Instituto de Victimologia in Peru, as with the Fundación de Victimologia in Spain, acknowledge victimology as a truly scientific discipline that is also highly humanistic. Furthermore, in many university-based courses victimology is still taught as a sub-discipline of criminology, in spite of the fact that crime is not the only source of victimisation.

In 1979 social scientists, in the main with criminological backgrounds, established the World Society of Victimology and began publishing a newsletter on activities relating to both science and also victim assistance. Since then affiliated national societies have formed in all settled continents. These societies share the object to advance victimology as a science. The constitution for the Australasian Society for Victimology (1988), for instance, states,

The objects of the society shall be to promote research about victims of crime … [and to] develop programmes of teaching and courses on victimology …

Conversely, the constitution for Victim Support Australasia (1997) states,

The objectives … [shall be to] encourage and assist development of consistent, high quality, equitable and accessible support services for people victimised by crime throughout Australasia; promote fair and equal recognition of the rights and interests of people victimised by crime; promote the legislative and other reforms throughout the criminal justice system that reflect the rights and interests of people victimised by crime …

Hence, there is a difference between the scientific victimologist and the humanist helper. The scientific should be kept separate from the helping, otherwise the interests that drive those to help victims might bias research. In other words, victim assistance is one of the objects of victimology, it is not victimology. Over the last decade or so, the World Society has attempted to highlight the separation yet the usefulness in collaboration. It now runs, for
example, post-graduate courses on victimology and victim assistance in Europe, Latin America and Asia. On these courses, academics provide insight and direction, while humanists demonstrate advocacy and resources.

CONCLUSION

Victimology is not a system of criminology or any other social science. Neither is victimology simply an extrapolation of principles developed in psychology. Although there was not much empiricism in the early days, victimology now utilises the data, theory and practices from other social sciences. It is not, however, simply a compilation of sociological, psychological and criminological knowledge. Conversely, victimology has not yet developed into a science with many ramifications, all aimed at putting the victim at the centre.

Putting the victim at the centre of both scientific and applied victimology is unifying and useful. Victimology is concerned with the application of knowledge to programmes and other initiatives to improve practical outcomes for victims. The convergence, not the merger, of theory and practice will ensure the survival of victimology.

Victims' needs, as well as the causes of criminal victimisation and the effects of crime, have been the objects of empirical research and analysis, yet victimological knowledge is limited. Victimology is not about the criminal justice system, nor is it about the helping system. Rather, it is about the victim; therefore, the victim must be the foci of the concepts, the theories and so on.

For this purpose, victimology needs to develop independently of other social sciences, especially criminology. Victimology's objective should be the development of a body of general and verified principles and of other types of knowledge regarding the causes and prevention of victimisation, the victimisation process, the effects of victimisation and the efficacy of treatment for effects. If it achieves this objective, then victimology will be accepted as intellectually serious, not just professionally respectable.

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